This article offers a philosophic understanding of dissidence. We present a conceptual analysis of dissidence as connected to a net of other philosophic concepts such as ‘virtue’ and ‘truth’. ‘Dissidence’, like ‘right’ and ‘liberty’, is used both in precise philosophic discourse and with greater variations of meaning in ordinary language. Our discussion springs from a philosophic discourse of dissidence that flourished in Czechoslovakia in the seventies and eighties, during the ‘normalization’ period between the Soviet invasion of 1968 and the Velvet (...) Revolution of 1989. During that period, a small section of Czechoslovak society found itself in a situation that was commonly referred to by the word ‘dissidence’. Since some dissidents were philosophers by inclination, education, or approach, they understood their situation by drawing on their philosophic background. The towering figure of dissident philosophy was Jan Patocka, one of the first spokespersons of Charter 77 on human rights and a student of Husserl. Of his students, Václav Havel and Petr Rezek made significant contributions to the philosophical discourse of the meaning of dissidence. Though emerging out of a particular historical context, post-Stalinist Communism, the discourse itself attempted to understand dissidence in universal philosophical terms. (shrink)

The Founding declaration of the journal.

ABSTRACT This is a philosophical treatment of the phenomenon of home. A distinction is drawn between home and permanent residence and birthplace. Through discussion of the philosophy of Vaclav Havel, home is discovered to be a multi‐level structure that may contain several homes on different and identical levels. Exclusionist concepts of home such as nationalism and fundamentalist monotheism deny this. Home is conditions that allow personal self fulfilment. Our actual home is the result of our efforts to reach our ideal (...) home, departing from our natural home. Hospitality, personal and collective, is extension of conditions of home to a guest who may be homeless or in exile. The current use of ‘home’ by inhospitable, excluding, territorial monopolies such as the European Community, the US immigration service, and Hong Kong officials, as in ‘returning refugees back home’, is an Orwellian misuse of the linguistically assumed, positive relations between person and home to legitimise morally abhorrent policies. (shrink)

The present book is a sequel to Ephraim Chamiel's two previous works The Middle Way and The Dual Truth-studies dedicated to the "middle" trend in modern Jewish thought, that is, those positions that sought to combine tradition and modernity, and offered a variety of approaches for contending with the tension between science and revelation and between reason and religion. The present book explores contemporary Jewish thinkers who have adopted one of these integrated approaches-namely the dialectical approach. Some of these thinkers (...) maintain that the aforementioned tension-the rift within human consciousness between intellect and emotion, mind and heart-can be mended. Others, however, think that the dialectic between the two poles of this tension is inherently irresolvable, a view reminiscent of the medieval "dual truth" approach. Some thinkers are unclear on this point, and those who study them debate whether or not they successfully resolved the tension and offered a means of reconciliation. The author also offers his views on these debates. This book explores the dialectical approaches of Rav Kook, Rav Soloveitchik, Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, Samuel Hugo Bergman, Leo Strauss, Ernst Simon, Emil Fackenheim, Rabbi Mordechai Breuer, his uncle Isaac Breuer, Tamar Ross, Rabbi Shagar, Moshe Meir, Micah Goodman and Elchanan Shilo. It also discusses the interpretations of these thinkers offered by scholars such as Michael Rosenak, Avinoam Rosenak, Eliezer Schweid, Aviezer Ravitzky, Avi Sagi, Binyamin Ish-Shalom, Ehud Luz, Dov Schwartz, Rabbi Yuval Cherlow, Lawrence Kaplan, and Haim Rechnitzer. The author questions some of these approaches and offers ideas of his own. This study concludes that many scholars bore witness to the dialectical tension between reason and revelation; only some believed that a solution was possible. That being said, and despite the paradoxical nature of the dual truth approach (which maintains that two contradictory truths exist and we must live with both of them in this world until a utopian future or the advent of the Messiah), increasing numbers of thinkers today are accepting it. In doing so, they are eschewing delusional and apologetic views such as the identicality and compartmental approaches that maintain that tensions and contradictions are unacceptable. (shrink)

Researchers in the life sciences often make uniqueness attributions; about branching events generating new species, the developmental processes generating novel traits and the distinctive cultural selection pressures faced by hominins. Yet since uniqueness implies non-recurrence, such attributions come freighted with epistemic consequences. Drawing on the work of Aviezer Tucker, we show that a common reaction to uniqueness attributions is pessimism: both about the strength of candidate explanations as well as the ability to even generate such explanations. Looking at two (...) case studies—elephant trunks and human teaching—we develop a more optimistic account. As we argue, uniqueness attributions are revisable claims about the availability of several different kinds of comparators. Yet even as researchers investigate the availability of such comparators, they are able to mobilize complex sets of empirical and theoretical tools. Rather than hindering scientific investigation, then, we argue that uniqueness attributions often spur the generation of a range of epistemic goods. (shrink)

Nadia Yala Kisukidi : Le titre de cet entretien reprend celui d’une communication que vous avez donnée à l’Université de Genève en juin 2012. Comme vous l’aviez indiqué alors, l’expression est tirée d’un texte de Léopold Sédar Senghor lui-même daté du 31 Décembre 1963 intitulé Hommage à Pierre Teilhard de Chardin [Senghor 1993, pp. 9-13], dont voici l’extrait : « Pendant des années, j’ai cherché Dieu dans l’œuvre immense des deux penseurs [il s’agit de Marx et Engels]. En vain. Et (...) pourtant je... (shrink)

Humanity Divided focuses on the multiple challenges associated with the concept of Israel's divine election, especially as reflected in the thought of Martin Buber and other Modern Jewish thinkers such as Franz Rosenzweig, Hermann Cohen, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, David Hartman, Hannah Arendt, and Aviezer Ravitzky. Particular attention is given to the practical application of Israel's chosenness to Jewish nationalism, Zionism, and political Messianism.

A traditional proposition in the philosophy and the sociology of science wants that consensus between specialists of a scientific discipline is a reliable indicator of their access to genuine knowledge. In an interesting reassessment of this principle, Aviezer Tucker has analyzed the implications and the significance of this thesis in relation to historical research, and has established that parts of the historiographical community that display high degrees of consensus among their practitioners can be described in terms of the same (...) relationship existing in empirical sciences between the exemplification of significant level of agreement and shared knowledge. After a concise summary of Tucker’s general view of the relationship between consensus and knowledge and an analysis of its discussion by Boaz Miller, this paper proposes a critical discussion of the limits and the virtues of this approach and concludes that it is possible to assume that a theory of the sort outlined by Tucker and Miller may describe in an exhaustive way the dynamics of the consensual communities only after some important caveats and integrations. In the closing section, a brief review of Tucker’s picture of historiographical consensus will be proposed. (shrink)

With a few yet increasing number of exceptions, the cognitive sciences enthusiastically endorsed the idea that there are basic facial expressions of emotions that are created by specific configurations of facial muscles. We review evidence that suggests an inherent role for context in emotion perception. Context does not merely change emotion perception at the edges; it leads to radical categorical changes. The reviewed findings suggest that configurations of facial muscles are inherently ambiguous, and they call for a different approach towards (...) the understanding of facial expressions of emotions. Prices of sticking with the modal view, and advantages of an expanded view, are succinctly reviewed. (shrink)

In proposition 7 of the second part of the Ethics, Spinoza famously contends that the “order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of ideas.” On this basis, Spinoza argues in the scholium that thought and extension are different ways of conceiving one and the same substance: “the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that”. Less famously, in the same scholium, (...) Spinoza insists that the relation of thought and extension is not the only issue at stake. He notes that “certain Hebrews” saw, “as if through a cloud,” the unity of God and the world in knowing: “they maintained that God, God’s intellect, and the things understood by him are one and the same.” The cloud is the idea of divine transcendence. Commenting on this passage, Aviezer Ravitzky has observed that Spinoza’s mention of these “certain Hebrews” should inform us about “an inherent problem, about dynamite concealed in the teachings of the Jewish Aristotelians such as Maimonides.” If, as Aristotle argues in the De Anima and Metaphysics, the knower and the known are one in knowing, then the distinction between God and the objects of God’s knowing is undermined. Noetic union is ontological union, for the intellect is its ideas. Thus Aristotelian noesis undermines divine transcendence. E2p7 and its scholium, then, presage the most famous—or infamous—expression of the Ethics, Deus sive Natura. Maimonides qualifies his Aristotelianism with an hierarchical emanationist cosmology, thereby avoiding the implications of noetic union by differentiating between the creator and the creatures and between the agent intellect, the lowest of the celestial spheres and source of the human acquired intellect, and the divine intellect. Gersonides, the fourteenth century giant of the medieval Jewish tradition and its most consistent Aristotelian, endorses the Aristotelian formula, arguing consistently that the intelligible is an intellect and offering a meticulous explanation of “why it is said of non-material things that the intellect, the thinker, and the intelligible are all one.” In this article, I argue that Gersonides’ own highly Averroian position is evoked in E2p7s and that Spinoza extends and radicalizes the Gersonidean inheritance. Beginning from E2p7 and its scholium, I explore the implications of noetic union for the relationship of God and the world and that between thought and extension. (shrink)

This is a welcome attempt to revive the largely moribund field of post‐analytic philosophy of history. Tucker wishes to make a clean break with previous debate concerning the essential form of historiography—in particular, whether historical explanation requires covering laws, singular causal claims, or narratives. Tucker's topic is rather the relation between present evidence and historiographical ‘hypotheses’. He asks whether such hypotheses are determined, underdetermined, or indetermined by the evidence. He argues that a large part of post‐Rankean historiography is determined by (...) the evidence, and should therefore be regarded as scientific. This historiographical development should be recognised as a significant achievement, indeed as a “third scientific revolution” (p. 260) (following Galileo and Newton). Some contemporary historiography is, however, underdetermined: this portion, together with all pre‐Rankean historiography, is ‘traditionalist historiography’. It makes no epistemic difference whether the historiographical hypotheses are straightforwardly descriptive, explanatory, narrative, or colligatory. (shrink)

A superb introduction to the ethical aspects of war and peace, this collection of tightly integrated essays explores the reasons for waging war and for fighting with restraint as formulated in a diversity of ethical traditions, religious and secular. Beginning with the classic debate between political realism and natural law, this book seeks to expand the conversation by bringing in the voices of Judaism, Islam, Christian pacifism, and contemporary feminism. In so doing, it addresses a set of questions: How do (...) the adherents to each viewpoint understand the ideas of war and peace? What attitudes toward war and peace are reflected in these understandings? What grounds for war, if any, are recognized within each perspective? What constraints apply to the conduct of war? Can these constraints be set aside in situations of extremity? Each contributor responds to this set of questions on behalf of the ethical perspective he or she is presenting. The concluding chapters compare and contrast the perspectives presented without seeking to adjudicate their differences. Because of its inclusive, objective, comparative, and dialogic approach, the book serves as a valuable resource for scholars, journalists, policymakers, and anyone else who wants to acquire a better understanding of the range of moral viewpoints that shape current discussion of war and peace. In addition to the editor, the contributors are Joseph Boyle, Michael G. Cartwright, Jean Bethke Elshtain, John Finnis, Sohail H. Hashmi, Theodore J. Koontz, David R. Mapel, Jeff McMahan, Richard B. Miller, Aviezer Ravitzky, Bassam Tibi, Sarah Tobias, and Michael Walzer. (shrink)

A collection of nine essays by one of the leading scholars in medieval Jewish Philosophy. The volume consists of two parts. Part I, entitled "Philosophy and History," includes essays on the study of medieval Jewish Philosophy, on the notion of Peace, on the political philosophy of Nissim of Gerona and Isaac Abrabanel, and on Maimonides' views on Messianism. In part II, "Philosophy and Faith," the subjects dealt with are: 'The God of the Philosophers and the God of the Kabbalists', the (...) notion of Miracle in medieval Jewish Philosophy, the esoteric character of Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed, and a lost Arabic recension of Aristotle's Parva Naturalia. Professor Aviezer Ravitzky is Chairman of the Department of Jewish Thought, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. (shrink)

1. Hisṭoryah ṿa-halakhah -- 2. Hagut ṿe-ḥadshanut.

Issues concerning technological risk have increasingly become the subject of deliberative exercises involving participation of ordinary citizens. The most popular topic for deliberation has been genetically modified foods. Despite the varied circumstances of their establishment, deliberative “minipublics” almost always produce recommendations that reflect a worldview more “precautionary” than the “Promethean” outlook more common among governing elites. There are good structural reasons for this difference. Its existence raises the question of why elites sponsor mini-publics and if policy is little affected by (...) the results of deliberations, questions the possibility of deliberative legitimation of public policy. We make this argument by looking at mini-publics on GM foods in France, the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and Switzerland. Deliberative legitimation becomes plausible if elites can attenuate their Promethean outlook. This is possible if ecological modernization discourse pervades their politics; Denmark provides an illustration. (shrink)

This critical review of Aviezer Tucker's Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography examines the character, scope, and limits of scientific historiography, the overall topic of Tucker's book. The review begins by arguing that the book both unwittingly juggles two criteria for scientific, as opposed to nonscientific, historiography - the production of knowledge and Kuhnian disciplinary matrices - and wrongly construes the subject matter of such historiography to be present evidence for the past as opposed to this (...) evidence in addition to the past itself. There ensues a lengthy discussion of the role of theories in scientific historiography that (1) contests Tucker's thesis that theories of information transmission and grand social theories are central to the enterprise, (2) criticizes his failure to distinguish technical from theoretical terms, and (3) claims that scholarly historiography is more of an art than a science. The review concludes by arguing that scientific historiography as Tucker conceives of it cannot meet the many needs society has vis- -vis the past. (shrink)

Aviezer Tucker claims that “home-searching is a basic trait of being human,” yet as a rule the concept of home has not been central in recent Anglophonic ethics. I will argue, though, that giving an important place to the concept of home should be far more common. I begin by showing that ‘home’ is a particular kind of concept, what Daniel Russell calls a model concept. I then turn to the main task of the paper, the construction of a (...) theoretical model of ‘home,’ bringing various treatments of the concept—linguistic, literary, and social scientific—into reflective equilibrium. Security, comfort, and belonging will turn out to be key features of the model. I close by noting some ways in which the concept of home is much more important to moral theory, and especially to virtue ethics, than has generally been recognized. The title refers both to our need for home, as humans, and to our need for ‘home,’ as moral theorists. (shrink)

The fifty entries in this _Companion_ cover the main issues in the philosophies of historiography and history, including natural history and the practices of historians. Written by an international and multi-disciplinary group of experts A cutting-edge updated picture of current research in the field Part of the renowned _Blackwell Companions_ series.

First attempt at applying contemporary philosophy of science to the basic problems of the philosophy of historiography that culminated in "Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography" (Cambridge University Press 2004).

The fifty entries in this Companion cover the main issues in the philosophies of historiography and history, including natural history and the practices of historians. •Written by an international and multi-disciplinary group of experts •A cutting-edge updated picture of current research in the field •Part of the renowned Blackwell Companions series.

Introduction to a special issue on the philosophy of historiography.

The experience of totalitarianism in its initial revolutionary-terrorist phase and later gray and corrupt terminal stage has generated a distinct tradition of political philosophy and theory among East-Central European dissidents. Much of this tradition has been ignored or misunderstood by thinkers who were ignorant of the social context from which it emerged and who had different concerns. Philosophers who consider the role of political philosophy to be the explication of concepts by drawing utopian blueprints for the reconstitution of societies, find (...) the anti-utopian—indeed, anti-political—philosophy of the dissidents incomprehensible. The dissidents, and by implication their writings, enjoyed some popularity during the…. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Unificationist Accounts of Causation Conditional Theories Counterfactuals Causation as a Process Probability Exceptionalism Eliminativism Primitivism References.

The First Czech language edition of "The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patocka to Havel" (Pittsburgh University Press 2000.

This paper applies Bayesian theories to critically analyse and offer reforms of intelligence analysis, collection, analysis, and decision making on the basis of Human Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, and Communication Intelligence. The article criticises the reliabilities of existing intelligence methodologies to demonstrate the need for Bayesian reforms. The proposed epistemic reform program for intelligence analysis should generate more reliable inferences. It distinguishes the transmission of knowledge from its generation, and consists of Bayesian three stages modular model for the generation of reliable (...) intelligence from multiple coherent and independent testimonial sources, and for the tracing and analysis of intelligence failures. The paper concludes with suggestions for further research, the development of artificial intellignce that may measure coherence and reliability of HUMINT sources and infer intelligence following the outlined general modular model. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 3, pp 333 - 348 Philosophers and historians debate not only the correct analysis of historiographic counterfactuals and their possible utilities for historiography and its philosophy but whether they can be more than speculative. This introduction presents the articles in the special issue on historiographic counterfactuals, show how they hang together and what are the main agreements and disagreements among the authors. Finally, it argues that the debate over historiographic counterfactuals spills over now into the (...) debate about applied or practical historiography, what we can learn from historiography. (shrink)

Explanations of descriptions of events are undivided, holistic, units of analysis for the purpose of justification. Their justifications are based on the transmission of information about the past and its interpretation and analysis. Further analysis of explanations of descriptions of events is redundant. The “holistic” model of explanations fits better the actual practices of scientists, historians and ordinary people who utter explanatory propositions than competing models. I consider the “inference to the best explanation” model and argue that under one interpretation, (...) it cannot account for all the paradigmatic cases of explanation of description of events that I present, though under another interpretation it fits comfortably with my holistic model. Finally, I argue that there is nothing intrinsic or structural to distinguish holistic explanations of descriptions of events from other hypothetical propositions because the pragmatic context of inquiry may well determine exclusively whether a proposition is considered explanatory. (shrink)